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INFORMED CONSENT LAWS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: BALANCING STATE INTERESTS
WITH A PHYSICIAN'S FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AND A WOMAN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Sarah Runels*

I. INTRODUCTION

Informed consent to medical treatment is both an issue of medical ethics
and a legally recognized doctrine of tort law.' The early common law
doctrine was based on an individual's right to protect her body from
unwanted physical intrusion. 2 Since the development of an action in tort
law, all fifty states have enacted statutes mandating informed consent before
a physician provides any medical treatment. 3 For consent to be informed,
there are generally three requirements: the physician must communicate all
necessary information to the patient, the patient must understand the

* J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, May
2010; B.A., The College of William and Mary, 2007. I would like to thank my fiancee,
family and friends for their support. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy for all their hard work and
encouragement. Special thanks to Jen Mraz and Lisa Brown for their insightful
comments.
1. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Id. (quoting
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)); see also AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PATIENT PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP Topics: INFORMED CONSENT,

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4608.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
2.

Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law 310 (2d ed. 2000).

3. American Medical Association, supra note I (stating that informed consent is a
"process of communication between a patient and physician that results in the patient's
authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention").

186

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy Vol. XXVI:I

4
provided information, and the patient must consent to the treatment.
Despite existing informed consent safeguards for all medical treatment,
states have enacted informed consent requirements specifically targeting
abortion procedures. 5 States enacting these targeted requirements generally
cite two reasons for doing so: protecting the potential for human life and
ensuring women
fully understand the psychological consequences of the
6
procedure.
According to the American Medical Association, informed consent to
medical treatment begins when a physician communicates all necessary
information to the patient regarding any treatment or procedure. 7 That
information typically includes:
the patient's diagnosis, if known; [t]he nature and purpose of a
proposed treatment or procedure; [t]he risks and benefits of a
proposed treatment or procedure; [a]ltematives ... ; [t]he risks and
benefits of the alternative treatment or procedure; and [t]he risks
and benefits
of not receiving or undergoing a treatment or
8
procedure.
Next, a physician must facilitate patient understanding by answering any
questions regarding the treatment or procedure. 9 Finally, a doctor must

4. Harper J. Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent,
Deference and FetalPain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111 (2008) [hereinafter
Tobin]; see NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SUBJECTS RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, 7 (1979),

available

at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html.
5. Guttmacher Institute, Mandatory Counseling and Waiting Periodsfor Abortion,
ST. POLICIES IN BRIEF, Sept. 1, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/

statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf. For an example of a typical abortion informed
consent law, see ALA. CODE § 26-23A-1 et seq (2002). The author of this Note
recognizes that many in the pro-choice community call these sorts of provisions "biased
counseling" instead of "informed consent." Both terms are politically charged and the
use of "informed consent" in this Note connotes nothing more than the term's wide use
and recognition.
6.

Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Blind: Informed Consent in

Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (2008).
7.

American Medical Association, supra note 1.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.
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ensure that a patient has consented to the treatment or procedure.' 0 Failure
to complete the informed consent process
can result in both legal and ethical
II
problems for the treating physician.
Abortion targeted informed consent provisions differ substantially from
the traditional informed consent doctrine. 12 First, the abortion targeted
provisions require physicians to graphically detail the procedure. 13 Second,
twenty-four states require a waiting period between the date of counseling
for the abortion and the actual procedure. 14 The traditional form of the
doctrine does not require waiting periods.' 5 Third, abortion targeted
informed consent laws require a physician to detail certain risks associated
with abortions that have not been scientifically proven. 16 Under the
traditional doctrine, data indicating that women receiving abortions are at
greater risk than those who have not had the procedure must be established
before the risk is communicated to the patient. 17 Finally, abortion targeted
provisions often require physicians to communicate "selective information
about the moral dimensions" of the woman's choice.1s Despite the large

10.

Id.

11.
Id. See JESSICA W. BERG, ET. AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 53-61, (2d ed. 2001) (detailing what courts generally require of

physicians in informed consent cases).
12.

Dresser, supra note 6, at 1617.

13.

Id.

14.

Guttmacher Institute, supra note 5.

15.

See Tobin, supra note 4, at 111-12.

16.

Guttmacher Institute, supra note 5.

Some of these non-scientifically proven

requirements include information regarding fetal pain, the link between abortion and
breast cancer, and the increased risk of a "negative emotional response." Id.

17.

Dresser, supra note 6, at 1618-19.

18. Id. at 1619. This is in contrast to other medical decisions, like "the removal of
life-sustaining treatment from patients in the persistent vegetative state," which do not
require physicians' to communicate moral judgment. Id. See also Acuna v. Turkish, 930
A.2d 416, 427-28 (N.J. 2007) (stating that "the common law doctrine of informed
consent requires doctors to provide their pregnant patients seeking an abortion only with
material medical information." (emphasis added)).
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percentage of states with heightened informed consent provisions, litiation
regarding the constitutionality of these requirements has been minimal.
The lines drawn in the abortion debate between the pro-choice and prolife communities are accentuated in the informed consent debate. On one
side, pro-choice advocates argue that many informed consent laws require
the distribution of false and misleading information to women. 20 These
advocates believe that existing informed consent laws adequately protect
women and the additional requirements only serve to inhibit a woman's right
to choose. 2 However, pro-life advocates argue that informed consent laws
are necessary to ensure that women are aware of the risks associated with
22
their decision.
This group believes that abortions have a negative
psychological impact on women, necessitating the presentation of additional
23
information.
Both sides of the argument demonstrate that the main focus
of these laws has been on women. However, informed consent laws also
threaten the physician's rights. Laws that require a physician to give women
specific information regarding abortions must be analyzed from the
perspective of the physician's First Amendment free speech right.2 4

19.

Tobin, supra note 4, at 114.

20.

National

Abortion

Federation,

Threats

to

Abortion

Rights:

Biased

Counseling/Waiting Period Bills (2009), http://www.prochoice.org/policy/states/biased
_counseling.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
21.

Id.

22. Ann Brennen, Knowledge is Power: Women 's Right to Know, THE AM. FEMINIST,
Winter 1997-1998, at 4, available at http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/1997/winter/

knoispow.htm.
23. Mailee R. Smith, Informed Consent Laws: Protectinga Woman's Right to Know,
DEFENDING LIFE 2009, 2009, at 149, available at http://dl.aul.org/wp-content/uploads
/pdfs/0 l/DL09InformedConsentLaws.pdf. This view has also been adopted by the Court
in Gonzales v. Carhart.Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (stating that "[w]hile

we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained"). Id. at 127. It is important to highlight the fact that Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority in Gonzales, noted that there is no reliable data to show
whether women do in fact regret their abortions.
24. See generally Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939 (2007) (analyzing

compelled physician speech in informed consent provisions).
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Accordingly, this Note argues that the constitutionality of informed
consent laws must be analyzed from both the physician's and the woman's
perspective. First, the laws must be examined to determine if they present
an undue burden on a woman's right to choose, constituting an
unconstitutional violation of a woman's due process rights.25 Second, the
laws must be considered from the physician's perspective to determine if
they infringe upon his or her freedom of speech. In PlannedParenthoodv.
Rounds,27 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a South Dakota
informed consent law that requires physicians to inform women, in writing,
"that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being.' 28 This Note argues that when the South Dakota law is
analyzed from the perspective of the woman and the physician, it seriously
jeopardizes the former's due process rights and the latter's free speech right.
As such, this Note argues that Planned Parenthood v. Rounds was
incorrectly decided.
Part I of this Note outlines the existence and use of the heightened
informed consent requirements. In addition, this section discusses the
failure of courts and advocates on both sides of the issue to fully address the
extent to which these requirements implicate physicians' and women's
rights. Part I1summarizes existing case law on informed consent provisions
and advocates for a more comprehensive framework challenging the
constitutionality of informed consent provisions. This framework includes a
legal analysis that takes both the woman's due process rights and the
physician's First Amendment rights into consideration. Part III analyzes the
recent Eighth Circuit decision in Planned Parenthoodv. Rounds. Finally,
Part IV of this Note will apply the framework developed in Part II to the
Eighth Circuit decision in Rounds.

25. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the necessity of analyzing informed
consent provisions from the perspective of a woman's due process rights.
26. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the necessity of analyzing informed
consent provisions from the perspective of a physician's First Amendment right to free
speech.
27. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008),
modifying No. 05 Civ. 04077 (2009 DSD).
28.

Id.at 726, 737-38.
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II. FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMED CONSENT LAWS: Two PERSPECTIVES

A. The Woman's Perspective: The Undue Burden Standardand Informed
Consent
In the 1992 Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,29 the Court was asked to determine whether a
Pennsylvania law requiring women to be provided with certain information
before receiving abortions was an unconstitutional violation of their due
process rights. Although the Court upheld the basic premise developed in
31
Roe v. Wade, that a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy, 32 it
expanded the role the state can play in regulating abortion rocedures. 3' The
Court replaced the trimester framework developed in Roe with a viability
framework.35 Under this analysis, the state may regulate the abortion
procedure throughout the pregnancy due to its interest in the potential for
human life.36 Unlike the trimester framework developed in Roe, which
favored the rights of women in the first trimester,3 7 the viability framework
recognizes a state's interest in the potential for human life from the moment

29.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

30.

Id. at 844.

31.

Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

32.

Id. at 153.

33.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.

34.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.

35.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.

36. Id. (stating that "[e]ven in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations."). The Court bases the change from a trimester to a viability
framework on advances in neo-natal care. Id. at 860. The Court says that these
advancements make it possible for a fetus to survive outside the womb at an earlier
gestational age than when the Court decided Roe. Id. The viability framework
establishes twenty-three to twenty-four weeks gestational age as a possible point for
viability. Id.
37.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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of conception. 38 The Court recognized that increased state regulation could
certainly burden a woman's pre-viability right to terminate her pregnancy,
but resolved that such burdens are only unconstitutional when undue.39 The
Court found that an undue burden exists when "a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." 4
According to Casey, a law will be deemed an unconstitutional violation of
a woman's due process rights when it acts as a substantial obstacle to her
ability to seek an abortion. Additionally, the Court found that truthful and
non-misleading informed consent provisions may be constitutionally
permissible. 42 In the materials that follow, this Note will show that both the
substantial obstacle test and the truthful, non-misleading standard are open
to considerable interpretation and could lead to conclusions that some
informed consent laws are unconstitutional.
1. The Substantial Obstacle Test
The substantial obstacle test in Casey requires an examination into either
the purpose of the law or its effect on a woman seeking an abortion. 43 In
overturning Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement, the Casey
Court found that "[i]n a large fraction of the cases in which [the abortion
restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion." 44 Therefore, if the effect of the law impacts
"a large fraction" of women, it may be considered impermissible.
In
Cincinnati v. Taft,46 the Sixth Circuit relied on data showing that a large

38.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.

39.

Id. at 875-77.

40.

Id. at 877.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 882.

43.

Tobin, supra note 4, at 124-27.

44.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.

45.

Id.

46.

Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006).
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fraction of women seeking abortions would be impacted by Ohio's abortion
restrictions to overturn a judicial bypass law.47
Although a majority of courts have relied on Casey's large fraction test,
another way to determine whether a law places a substantial obstacle in the
way of a woman seeking an abortion is to consider its purpose. 48 There are
two ways to determine whether the purpose of the law is to set a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. 49 Although the
legislative history of a law can help to determine what the legislature
actually intended, the purpose served by the legislation can be used to
determine whether a substantial obstacle exists. 50 In Planned Parenthoodof
GreaterIowa v. Atchison, 51 the Eighth Circuit found that when a law treated
clinics providing abortions differently from clinics that did not, an undue
burden was placed on women seeking abortions. 52 In this case, the Eighth
Circuit found that the disparate treatment of clinics that perform abortions
and non-abortion performing clinics was enough to demonstrate that the
53
state action placed a substantial burden on women seeking abortions.
While the action in Atchison may have been constitutional under the large
fraction test, the court found that since the purpose of the action was to place
a substantial obstacle in the way of women attempting to receive abortions,
it was unconstitutional. 54

47. Id.at 372-73. The court in Taft also considered the constitutionality of an inperson, informed consent requirement and a waiting period. Id. Applying the Casey
large fraction test, the court found that neither requirement was unconstitutional. Id.at
372-74.
48.

Tobin, supra note 4, at 125-27.

49.

Id.at 126.

50.

Id.

51.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997).

52. Id.at 1049. This case arose when an application process for health institutions,
which had been ignored for ten years, was suddenly imposed on Planned Parenthood of
Iowa. Id. at 1044. The court held that the sudden use of this largely defunct application
process was unconstitutional, stating "[w]here a requirement serves no purpose other than
to make abortions more difficult, it strikes at the heart of a protected right, and is an

unconstitutional burden on that right." Id.at 1049.
53.

Id.at 1049.

54.

Id.
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2. Truthful and Non-MisleadingStatements May Not Be an Undue
Burden
In Casey, the Court upheld Pennsylvania's informed consent provision by
finding that even though the law attempted to encourage a woman to carry
the pregnancy to term, it did not impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose 5 The Court stated that "[i]f the information the State
requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading,
the requirement may be permissible." 56 This statement by the Court raises
several relevant questions that have yet to be answered. First, by finding
that truthful and non-misleading statements may be permissible, the Court
has implicitly held that false and misleading statements would be an undue
burden on a woman's right to choose. 57 Second, by using the word "may,"
the Court leaves open the possibility that truthful and non-misleading
information may not be permissible. Third, the Court does not resolve
whether a statement can be permissible if it is truthful and misleading.
Take, for example, a hypothetical state law mandating that the abortion
procedure is explained in vivid detail to a patient. While the information is
certainly true, the gruesome detail of the procedure may mislead women by

55. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). Casey was
not the first time that informed consent provisions had been an issue before the Court. In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduction Health, the Court invalidated the
provisions at issue because they required a doctor to go beyond what informed consent
calls for. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproduction Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452
(1983). The Court said that informed consent is "the giving of information to the patient
as to just what would be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than
this might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable
straightjacket in the practice of medicine." Id. at 443 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n. 8 (1976)). In Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's informed consent
provisions, stating that the giving of information regarding possible effects on a woman's
mental health was "compelled information" that is "the antithesis of informed consent."
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986).
The Casey Court overruled aspects of both Akron and Thornburgh saying, "when the
government requires ...the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information ...

those cases

[Akron and Thornburgh] go too far, are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an
important interest in potential life, and are overruled." Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
56.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.

56.

Id. at 882.

57.

See Tobin, supra note 4, at 123.

194
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portraying this procedure as particularly horrific. In reality, a detailed
description of any major medical procedure would be gruesome. In fact, the
heightened description requirements that are part of some informed consent
58
laws disclose far more information than is required for riskier procedures.
Fourth, it is not clear whether a false and non-misleading statement would be
permissible. Finally, the Court has not resolved what truthful or nonmisleading means in the context of abortion procedures.59
B. The Physician'sPerspective: Compelled Speech and Informed Consent
Laws
Since informed consent provisions require physicians to communicate
certain information to their patients, a physician's First Amendment right to
freedom of speech is necessarily implicated. 60 In addition to addressing a
woman's due process rights, a court ruling on the constitutionality of an
informed consent provision must also address the physician's First
Amendment right to free speech. 6'

58. See supra Part I which discusses the usual requirements for informed consent. In
fact, this issue raises another interesting point regarding informed consent. It is in this
author's opinion that the purpose of informed consent is not to focus on the procedure
involved, but instead to focus on the patient.
Requiring heightened descriptive
requirements for a relatively low risk procedure, like an abortion, shifts the focus away
from the patient and to the particulars of the procedure involved.
59. An example of this scenario would be the link between abortion and depression
discussed in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Ginsberg's dissent in
Gonzales. Justice Kennedy concedes that no data shows that a link between abortion and
depression has been discovered. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007).
Yet, Justice Kennedy maintains that "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow"
an abortion. Id. Justice Ginsberg notes that no scientific studies have conclusively
shown an increased risk of depression following an abortion. Id. at 184 n. 7 (Ginsberg,
J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Ginsberg highlights the paternalistic nature of the
Court's decision. Instead of allowing a woman to be informed of different procedures and
their risks, the Court has denied one type of abortion procedure by upholding the partialbirth abortion ban based on a woman's "fragile, emotional state." Id. at 184. Justice
Ginsberg argues that this kind of reasoning "reflects ancient notions about a women's
place in the family and under the Constitution ideas that have long since been
discredited." Id. at 185.
60.

See generally Post, supra note 24.

61.

Id.
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1. Compelled Speech is Unconstitutional
To determine whether a violation of a person's freedom of speech has
occurred, a court must first determine whether an action implicates the First
Amendment. 62 In Wooley v. Maynard,663 the Supreme Court addressed a
New Hampshire law prohibiting people from covering up the state's motto
"Live Free or Die" on their license plate. 64 The Court considered whether
this statute violated the right to freedom of speech.65 Maynard, a Jehovah's
Witness, felt that the state's motto was contrary to the tenets of his
religion. 66 In overturning the law, the Court first determined whether First
67
Amendment protections were implicated. The Supreme Court held that the
"right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state
action includes the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
,,68
speaking at all..
Therefore, a state law that compels citizens to adopt a
certain point of view necessarily implicates the First Amendment right not to
speak.
Next, the Court considered whether the state had a compelling interest to
justify the infringement on Maynard's First Amendment right.70 New
Hampshire advanced two theories to justify the infringement: identification
The Supreme Court
and "history, individualism, and state pride. '1
dismissed both of these arguments by stating that "where the State's interest
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such

62.

E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.at 707-15.

67.

Id.at714-15.

68.

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 716.

71.

Id.
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interest cannot outweigh an individual's7 First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message. 2
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes compelled
speech again in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Public Utilities
Commission.73
In this case, the Court determined whether a First
Amendment violation existed when California required privately held utility
companies to distribute disputed third-party speech in their billing
envelopes.74 In ruling in favor of the utility company, Pacific Gas, the
Supreme Court found that the company's First Amendment free speech right
was implicated because "the choice to speak includes within it the choice of
what not to say.", 75 Applying the second step in the Wooley analysis, the
Court held that California had not justified the intrusion on the company's
First Amendment right because the requirement imposed on the utility
companies was not a "narrowly tailored means of furthering a compelling
state interest. ' ' 76 Based on the two prongs of this analysis, the Court found
that the law was unconstitutional.7 7
2. Applying the Supreme Court's Compelled Speech Analysis to
Informed Consent Provisions
The Court in Casey briefly addressed whether or not Pennsylvania's
informed consent law violated a physician's freedom of speech. 78 It began
by noting that informed consent laws do implicate this right. 79 In so doing,
the Court cited Wooley's proposition that freedom of speech includes the
freedom not to speak. ° After a brief discussion, the Court ruled that the

72.

Id. at 717.

73.

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1,4 (1986).

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 16.

76.

Id. at 21.

77.

Id. at 21-22.

78.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).

79. Id.

80. Id.
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compelling state interest in regulating "part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable licensing and regulations by the state ' 8 1 was a
permissible infringement of a physician's freedom of speech. 2
This ruling raises three issues that may form the basis for challenging the
constitutionality of informed consent provisions. First, Professor Robert
Post labeled regulated physician speech "professional speech. 83 In his
analysis, professional speech is not afforded the same sort of protection as
other forms of speech.
In addition, he distinguishes this sort of speech
from "physicians' speech that does not form part of the practice of
medicine." 85 This distinction may be crucial to upholding challenges to
informed consent laws. 86 Second, the Court in Casey did not say whether a
compelling state interest exists when the state regulations are unreasonable.
These provisions could be invalidated by arguing that informed consent
provisions are an unreasonable regulation of physicians' speech. Third, the
Casey Court did not discuss whether laws not aimed at regulating the
practice of medicine could still justify infringing upon a physician's freedom
of speech. Although the Court has ruled on whether states may regulate
physician speech through informed consent laws, the ruling is not
dispositive. Questions regarding what constitutes "reasonable regulation" of
physician speech remain unresolved and answers will not be reached until
additional litigation occurs.
C. Applying the Woman/PhysicianFrameworkto Informed Consent
Provisions
In order for courts to comprehensively address the constitutional issues
raised by informed consent provisions, they must analyze these provisions
from both the perspective of women's due process rights and physicians'

81.

Id. (emphasis added).

82.

Id.

83.

Post, supra note 24, at 947. Professor Post defines professional speech as that

"uttered in the course of professional practice."

Id.(quoting Daniel Halberstam,

Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 843 (1999)).

84.

Id.at 949-50.

85.

Id.at 952.

86.

Id.
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First Amendment right to free speech. Although the Court analyzed
Pennsylvania's informed consent provisions from both perspectives in
Casey, it gave too cursory a review of a physician's rights. Additionally, the
lack of litigation concerning these provisions has caused the constitutional
issues that are implicated in requiring physicians to communicate certain
information to women to be underdeveloped.
In order to further cultivate these constitutional issues, courts must apply
the following dual-perspective framework. When courts are faced with a
constitutional challenge to an informed consent provision, they must analyze
it from both the woman's and physician's perspective.
First, while
analyzing a woman's due process rights, courts must look to see if the
purpose or effect of the law places a substantial burden on a woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy.
Additionally, in these types of cases, courts
88
must ascertain whether the statements are truthful and non-misleading.
Second, when analyzing a physician's First Amendment free speech right,
the courts must decide whether the physician's speech is actually
implicated. 89 This inquiry involves determining whether the speech is
"professional speech" that is not granted the same protection as other forms
of speech. 9° If it is not professional speech, the inquiry turns to whether a
physician is unconstitutionally compelled to speak. 91 Then, if the court does
indeed determine that the physician's speech rights are implicated, it must
decide if the state is justified in regulating the speech. 92 Recent informed
consent provisions in South Dakota and the subsequent 9litigation
concerning
those provisions offer a chance to apply this framework. 3

87.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).

88.

See, e.g., id. at 882.

89.

See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).

90.

See Post, supra note 24, at 952-53.

91.

See, e.g., Maynard,430 U.S. at 715-16.

92.

Id.

93.

See Part III, infra.
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III. ANALYSIS:

PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. ROUNDS

A. BackgroundInformation
Since 1993, South Dakota has required that any woman considering an
abortion must be informed of the risks associated with the procedure and the
gestational age of the fetus. 9 4 A woman must also be told that the father
may be liable for child support payments and that other assistance might be
95
In 2005, South
the pregnancy to .term.
available to help her if she carries
96
. . ..
Dakota expanded existing informed consent provisions by passing a new
law that requires physicians to present the following information, in writing,
to a woman seeking an abortion prior to the procedure:
(b) That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being;(c) That the pregnant woman has an
existing relationship with that unborn human being and that the
relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution
and under the laws of South Dakota;(d) That by having an
abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional
rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated;(e) A
description of all known medical risks of the procedure and
statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman
would be subjected, including:(i) Depression and related
psychological distress;(ii) Increased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide...97
Further, the law requires that the woman sign a document stating that the
abortion provider has given her the required materials. 98 The physician must
read
also sign a document stating that the woman has received the materials,
99
over them, and as far as the physician can tell, understands them.

94. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 34-23A-10.1 (2005) (setting forth the language of the
1993 statute in the "Historical and Statutory Notes" following the text of the amended
statute).
95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at §§ 34-23A-10.1(l)(b)-(e)(ii).

98.

Id. at § 34-23A-10.1.

99.

Id.
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Prior to the enactment of this law, Planned Parenthood of Minnesota,
North Dakota, and South Dakota brought an action against the Governor of
South Dakota, Mike Rounds, to enjoin the act from taking effect. 00° Planned
Parenthood attacked the South Dakota provision as a violation of a
physician's freedom of speech and an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose. 10 1 The District Court ruled in favor of Planned Parenthood and
issued a preliminary injunction against the state. 102 Thus, the law was
prevented from taking effect.' 0 3 In so ruling, the Court held that this statute
violated a physician's freedom of speech." °4
B. The District Court'sRuling

The District Court noted that while informed consent laws do implicate a
physician's First Amendment right to free speech, this only occurs "as part
of the practice of medicine, which is subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the state."' 0 5 Following this line of reasoning, the District
Court then distinguished the 2005 provisions from those considered under
Casey.106 Adhering to Casey's reasoning, the District Court held that a state
may express a preference for childbirth, but may not require physicians to
''espouse the State's ideology," as this would violate their First Amendment
speech right.! ° 7 It further found that the law at issue would require
physicians to express the State's view on an "unsettled medical,
philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus is a

100. See generally Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d
881 (D.S.D. 2005), affd, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.
2008), modifying, No. 05 Civ. 04077 (D.S.D. 2009).
101.

Id. at 885.

102.

1d. at 889.

103.

Id.

104. Id. at 885-88 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992)).
105.

Id. at 885.

106.

Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 886.

107.

Id. at 887.
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human being." 10 8 Additionally, the District Court found it troubling that,
unlike the provisions at issue in Casey, the South Dakota statute did not
allow a physician to dissociate himself from the required statements because
the statute demands that he make sure the woman understands the
information. 10 9 If doctors were to dissociate themselves from the statements,
they would not be able to fulfill the state's mandate that requires them to
ensure that women understand the information. 10 The District Court
concluded that "the informed consent provisions of the statute are
unconstitutional compelled speech, rather than reasonable regulations of the
medical profession."' III Although the District Court correctly analyzed the
South Dakota provisions from the physician's perspective, they did not
address whether a woman's due process rights were also implicated.
C. The Eighth CircuitPanel'sRuling
South Dakota appealed the District Court's ruling, arguing that the
statements presented scientific facts. 12 Thus, it argued that they are
constitutional as part of a state's reasonable regulation of physician
speech.'13 The State's first argument on appeal was that because the 2005
provisions referenced "human being" and this phrase had been defined
elsewhere in the code as a "living member of the species Homo sapiens," a
medical and scientific consensus existed. 14 The Eighth Circuit panel
rejected this argument. 115 The panel found that the term "human being" is a

108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS

§ 34-23A- 10.1.

111. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
112. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir.
2006), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (rehearing en banc), modifying, No. 05 Civ.
04077 (D.S.D. 2009).
113.

Id.

114. Id.; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-8 (2005), repealed by SL 1977, ch. 189, §
126, SL 1977, ch. 190, §§ 63, 64.
115.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 723.
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1 16
much broader concept than indicated by the statute's definition.
Additionally, it found the provision requiring physicians to tell patients
"[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being" troubling under the standards outlined in Roe. 1 7 As assessed
by the circuit panel, the Supreme Court held in Roe that Texas could not
forbid abortions from the moment of conception because "there was no
medical, scientific, or moral consensus about when life begins, making the
question of when a fetus or embryo becomes a human being one of
individual conscience and belief."'1 18 The panel agreed with the District
Court that the phrase "whole, separate, unique, living human being" was the
type of value judgment prohibited by Roe because it was an attempt by1 the
19
state to settle the question of "when a fetus ... becomes a human being."'
South Dakota's second argument on appeal was that the State is justified
in infringing upon a physician's First Amendment free speech right.' 20 To
rebut this proposition, Planned Parenthood argued that the State was
required to use the least burdensome means available to meet its interest in
protecting maternal health and the potential for human life.'1'
The panel
agreed with Planned Parenthood, finding that South Dakota failed to show
that they employed the least burdensome means available. 12 Additionally,
South Dakota argued that the informed consent provisions could be
construed as constitutional because the provisions permitted physicians to
dissociate themselves from the statement. 123 The panel disagreed with the
State on this point. 124 It adopted the District Court's finding that a

116.

Id.

117.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 34-23A- 10. 1(b) (2005); see Rounds, 467 F.3d at 724.

118.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 724 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-61 (1973)).

119.

Id.

120.

Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).

121.

Id.

122. Id. at 724-25 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1986)).
123.

Id. at 725.

124.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 725.
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physician's ability to dissociate herself from the statement was hindered by
the requirement that the physician certify a patient's understanding of the
materials presented to her. Y
The Court went further by distinguishing the provisions at issue in this
case from those addressed in Casey. 126 The court found that the right of
dissociation was only implicated under Casey when the statements were
generally accurate, even if they were potentially misleading to a given
patient. 27 Where, like the 2005 provisions, the required statement is
subjective and political in nature, "the issue becomes not the message itself,
but the physician's right to control her own expression for 'the choice to
speak includes within it the choice of what not to say."' 128 The panel held
that the 2005 provisions constituted compelled speech because the informed
consent provisions required a physician to communicate the state's ideology
129
and provided criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the statute.
violation of a physician's First
Thus, they were an unconstitutional
130
Amendment right to free speech.
Unlike the District Court, the panel addressed whether the 2005
provisions violated a woman's due process rights. 131 Employing the undue
burden framework from Casey, it began by noting that a state may enact
The panel held that
regulations involving the practice of medicine.
"[d]isclosure requirements which hinder a woman's free and informed
choice rather than assist it would violate Casey."133 The panel distinguished
the South Dakota provisions from informed consent laws previously

125.

Id.

126.

Id. at 726.

127.

Id.

128.

Id. at 725 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16).

129.

Id. at 724-25.

130.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 727-28.

131.

Id. at 726.

132.

Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992)).

133.

Id.
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considered by other courts, including those laws considered in Casey.
The Court found it dispositive that a woman, in a vulnerable state, was
forced to read page after page of content indicating the "state's moral and
philosophical objections to the procedure." ' 35 This situation, the panel
noted, was different from that in Casey, where a woman was required to read
only factual information.' 3 6 Its conclusion stated that the provisions "are far
more onerous than what federal courts have previously reviewed, and there
137
is at least a 'fair chance' that they pose an undue burden."'
D. RehearingEn Banc

On April 11, 2007, the Eighth Circuit elected to grant a rehearing en banc
to reconsider the standard a moving party must meet in order for the court to
issue a preliminary injunction. 13 8 Over a year later, on June 27, 2008, the en
banc court reversed the Eighth Circuit panel's decision, and ruled in favor of
South Dakota.1 39 Central to this ruling was the statutory definition of
"human being."' 140 The en banc court began by noting that the state cannot
compel a physician to provide the state's ideological position.14 ' However,
"it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to 'provide truthful,
non-misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have an
abortion."" 42 The en banc court seemed to concede that, read in isolation,
43
the 2005 provisions may convey the state's ideological position.

134.

Id. at 726-27.

135.

ld. at 727.

136.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 726.

137.

Id. at 727.

138. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 731-33 (8th Cir.
2008) (rehearing en banc), modifying, No. 05 Civ. 04077 (D.S.D. 2009).
139.

Id. at 738.

140.

Id. at 735.

141.

Id. at 733.

142.

Id. at 734-35

143.

Id. at 735.
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However, it stated that their role is to "examine the disclosure actually
mandated, not one phrase in isolation." 144 Accordingly, the en banc court
rejected Planned Parenthood's assertion that a woman would interpret the
145
term "human being" more broadly than what is mandated by the code.
The en banc court asserted that when a statute defines a term, its definition
controls.1 46 Thus, the informed consent provisions were meant to be read
"inconcert" with the statutory definition of "human being." 147 When read
together, the narrow meaning
of "human being" becomes apparent and thus
14
would not mislead women.
To emphasize that the mandated statement was truthful, the en banc court
used Planned Parenthood's own affidavit that indicated that the scientific
and factual way to describe a fetus is by stating that it is a "developing
organism of the species Homo Sapiens."
The en banc court found that
this statement supported the "biological underpinnings" advanced by the
state in requiring the disclosures.
Having found the statement to be
truthful and non-misleading, the court found that Planned Parenthood had
not met its burden of showing that the mandated statement represented
unconstitutionally compelled speech. 5'
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DID NOT APPLY THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYZING THE INFORMED CONSENT PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit en banc court failed to employ
the appropriate framework for determining the constitutionality of South
Dakota's informed consent provisions. One issue that was not addressed by

144.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735.

145.

Id. at 735, 737.

146. Id. at 735 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.Ct.
1184, 1190 (2008) and Bruggerman v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification
Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)).
147.

Id.at 735-36.

148.

Id.

149.

Id. at 736.

150.

Rounds, 467 F.3d at 736.

151.

Id. at 737-38.

206

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law andPolicy Vol. XXVI:I

the circuit court was whether the mandated statement presents an undue
burden on a woman's due process rights.' 52 This issue was not considered
by the District Court either. 153 While it may have been appropriate to not
raise the issue en banc, Judge Murphy was correct in his dissent that the en
banc court "depart[ed] from established practice by not remanding for the
district court to have the opportunity to apply the new standard [for granting
a preliminary injunction] to the constitutional issues raised by Planned
Parenthood.' ' 154 On remand, the District Court could have addressed the
additional constitutional issues raised by Planned Parenthood, including: (1)
that the provisions violate a woman's due process rights; and (2) that the
other sections of the 2005 provisions violate a physician's First Amendment
right to free speech.
Had the case been remanded, it is possible that the court would have
found that South Dakota's informed consent provisions placed an undue
burden on a woman's due process rights. When analyzing whether an undue
burden exists, courts must determine whether a substantial obstacle has
encumbered a woman's right of access to an abortion.1 55 While it is not
exactly clear how false and misleading information would be treated under
the substantial obstacle test, this case presents a good opportunity to clarify
the issue. 56 Judge Murphy's dissent argues that the "apparent intent and
probable effect [of the informed consent provisions] is to place substantial
obstacles in the way of a woman . . ." seeking an abortion. 157 Stating that a
woman seeking an abortion is terminating a "whole, separate, unique, living

152.

See id.

153. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F.Supp. 2d 881 (D.
S.D. 2005), aft'd, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008),
modifying, No. 05 Civ. 04077 (D.S.D. 2009); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), modifying, No. 05 Civ. 04077 (D.S.D. 2009).
154.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 739 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

155.

See supra Part II.A.I.

156. Use of the words "may be permissible" when referring to "truthful, nonmisleading statements" in Casey seems to confirm that false, misleading statements may
not be permissible. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
Since permissibility of provisions is judged against the undue burden standard, the use of
the word "may" suggests that when the issue may not be permissible, that statement has
been deemed an undue burden.
157.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 747 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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158
human being" violates the central tenet of liberty as defined in Casey.
This definition provides that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, or meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. ' 159 By mandating this definition of "human being,"
the state inevitably defines the concept of "the mystery of human life," and
deprives an individual of the right to decide this concept for herself; a right
which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 160
In addition to the en banc court's failure to account for due process
violations, they also neglected to sufficiently review the First Amendment
claim of the physician. 1 It placed particular importance on the fact that the
term "human being" as used in Section 7(1)(b) was previously defined by
the South Dakota legislature. 162
Thus, the initial definition was
controlling. 63 However, the dissent rightly points out that this definition of
"human being" should be inapplicable in the context of abortion.' 64 In the
debate over the legality of abortion, the definition of what constitutes a
human being is often the linchpin of each argument. 165 As the dissent states,
"the term 'human being' has an overwhelmingly subjective, normative
meaning, in some sense encompassing the whole philosophical debate about
the procedure.' ' 166
Requiring physicians to use such a politically,
emotionally, and spiritually charged term in the context of a doctor-patient

158.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009); Casey, 505

159.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

U.S. at 851 (1992).

160. Id. The dissent points out other grounds for due process violations including
void for vagueness, and an unconstitutional interference in doctor patient privacy.
Rounds, 530 F.3d at 748-49. These issues, not addressed by either the District Court or
the Eighth Circuit en banc, would have been addressed had the court remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the new standard they enunciated for determining
when a preliminary injunction would be granted.
161.

See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733-38.

162.

Id. at 735-36.

163.

See supra Part III.D.

164.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

165.

Id.

166.

Id.
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relationship goes beyond professional speech and crosses over
167 to compelled
speech that does not form "part of the practice of medicine."
The dissent then questions whether the definition of "human being," as
defined by the legislature, is constitutional. 16 Since the majority finds the
constitutionality of Section 7(l)(b) to be dependent on the legislature's
definition of "human being" in Section 8(4), it is necessary to also
determine whether Section 8(4) itself is constitutional.169 The dissent argues
that the definition of "human being" found in Section 8(4) is not
constitutional. 17 This section defines "human being" as "an individual
living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human
being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full
gestation." 17 1 The dissent, citing Roe v. Wade, also points out that "a state
may not adopt one theory of the beginning of life."' 172 By adopting the
"metaphysical viewpoint that a 'human being' is 'living . . . from
fertilization,"' the state has explicitly adopted
a theory of the beginning of
73
life that is unconstitutional under Roe.1
The dissent further points out that the issue in this case was not merely the
174
use of the phrase "human being" but the whole phrase in Section 7(1)(b).
The terms "separate" and "whole" are also included in the language of the

167.

See Post, supra note 24. See also, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505

U.S. 833, 884 (1992). The dissent in the Eighth Circuit en banc court points out that
"[t]he philosophical or religious question of when a human life comes into existence is
distinct from the scientific question of whether a fetus is biologically a member of the
species." Rounds, 530 F.3d at 747 (Murphy, J., dissenting). This is precisely why the
term "human being" as used in the South Dakota statute may not be constitutional under
Casey's ruling that allows states to compel speech which forms "part of the practice of
medicine." Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
168.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

169.

Jd.at 742-46.

170.

Id.at 745.

171.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1 (4) (2008).

172.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 745 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

173.

Id.
at 745-46.

174.

See id at 744.
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statute.175 Based on their everyday meaning, each of these words requires a
physician to provide a non-medical and non-scientific statement.
The
77
word "separate" conveys the idea of detachment, or being disconnected.
To use "separate" when describing a fetus would be incorrect since the fetus
is attached to the woman by the umbilical cord. 178 Additionally, the word
"whole" conveys a sense of completeness that would not be appropriate for a
still-developing fetus. 179 While the term "human being" may be defined by
statute and have a biological meaning, the other words preceding "human
being" do not have such a meaning. IN Requiring physicians to make nonmedical and non-scientific assertions clearly goes beyond the reasonable
regulation requirement as defined in Casey. 181The statement mandated by
the statute represents unconstitutionally compelled speech.
Thus, the
decision reached by the Eighth Circuit en banc court was incorrect.
Although the en banc court addressed a physician's First Amendment
right of free speech,182 they failed to do so in a thorough manner. The court
focused their analysis too narrowly on the statutory definition of "human
83
being" in an effort to uphold the informed consent provisions.
Additionally, the court did not address whether the definition is
constitutional. 84 In failing to address the constitutionality of the phrase as
defined in Section 7(l)(b), the en banc court's analysis of a physician's First
Amendment rights was incomplete. 85 Furthermore, the en banc court failed

175.

S.D. COD[FIEDLAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2009).

176. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
177. Id.at 744.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181.

Id.at 741-42.

182. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733-48.
183. Id.
184. Id.

185.

Id. at 744 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy Vol. XXVI:I

to apply the first prong of the comprehensive framework test outlined in this
Note. The test states that informed consent provisions must take into
account both a woman's due process rights and a physician's First
Amendment right to free speech. In failing to perform the first prong of the
comprehensive framework test, the en banc court's ruling in the case was
incomplete. Had the en banc court followed precedent and remanded the
case to the District Court for application of the new standard for granting
preliminary injunctions, the District Court could have comprehensively ruled
on all the constitutional issues raised by South Dakota's informed consent
provisions. 186
V. CONCLUSION

When analyzing informed consent provisions, courts should first
determine whether the provisions place an undue burden on a woman's due
process rights. Second, they should determine whether the provisions are an
unconstitutional violation of a physician's First Amendment free speech
right. Only after analyzing the informed consent provisions through this
framework can the provisions be deemed constitutional.
In Planned
Parenthoodv. Rounds, the District Court was correct in finding that the
provisions violated a physician's First Amendment right to free speech.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit panel decision was correct in finding that
the provisions further violated a woman's due process rights. By confining
their analysis to whether a particular part of the 2005 provisions violated a

186. On August 20, 2009, the District Court released the most recent opinion in the
case. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, No. 05-04077, 1 (D.S.D. 2009).
The en banc court had remanded the case to the district court for consideration of
outstanding issues. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 738. Both Planned Parenthood and the South
Dakota Governor and Attorney General filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Rounds,
No. 05-4077 at 2. Planned Parenthood argued that the remaining sections of South
Dakota's informed consent provision violated the Constitution. Id. at 1-2. The Governor
and Attorney General of South Dakota argued that the remaining sections of the state's
informed consent provision did not violate the Constitution. Id In ruling that parts of the
informed consent provision were constitutional and parts were not, the District Court
relied on the truthful, non-misleading standard from Casey and the void for vagueness
doctrine. Id. at 6, 12, 17, 22, 33. As this Note has argued, in order for a court to
comprehensively decide whether informed consent provisions are constitutional, the court
needs to analyze the provisions from both the woman's and the physician's perspective.
In this case, the District Court evaluated the constitutionality of the provisions from the
woman's perspective by employing the truthful, non-misleading standard. See, e.g., id. at
12. However, the court completely ignored the physician's perspective. It is unclear
whether this is because Planned Parenthood failed to include it in their Motion for
Summary Judgment or because the court failed to include the physician's perspective in
their analysis. What is clear is that the court ignored a major aspect of the analysis.
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physician's First Amendment free speech right and not remanding the issue
to the District Court for reanalysis under a different standard, the en banc
court failed to address important constitutional issues that affect the citizens
of their circuit.

